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Legal sanction, international organisations and the Bangladesh Accord 
Richard Croucher, Mark Houssart, Philip James, Lilian Miles 
Industrial Law Journal 2018 
Abstract 
 
We use recent research and two 2018 arbitration cases to argue that the 2013 Bangladesh 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety represents a regulatory model that is in principle worthy 
of extension to other countries and sectors. .It has achieved considerable membership from 
purchasing multinationals and other stakeholders, and has successfully secured major 
improvements to building safety.  It implicitly challenges arguments in favour of non- legally 
supported approaches.  We argue that its legal basis is the crucial underlying component of its 
success and has in significant respects been strengthened in its revised 2018 iteration.  In 
view of the weakness of local worker voice, the involvement of the Global Union Federations 
(GUFs), acting in collaboration with NGOs, was significant in securing the benefits achieved.  
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The 2013 Accord on Fire and Building Safety was created to improve conditions in 
Bangladesh garment factories after the Rana Plaza disaster in which over a thousand workers 
were killed.  It has had considerable success, despite continuing issues (James et al, 
2018).The long-established Global Union Federations (GUFs) are involved in the Accord’s 
Steering Committee and that committee is chaired by an International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) representative, lending it further international credibility. Despite the obvious potential 
drawbacks that legal regulation represents for them, there are also advantages for them and 
more than 200 global brands are members of the Accord organisation and espouse its 
principles. Vitally, it provides for legally-binding arbitration in signatory companies’ home 





programme.The Accord’s implementation, further illustrated below, illustrates how such an 
approach, firmly based on well-specified legal enforcement, can support the effective 
implementation of standards to which multinational brands have subscribed.This is 
particularly the case since two recent arbitration cases, reported on below, have been initiated 
and voluntarily resolved in pro-labour senses under the Accord’s legally-based dispute 
resolution provisions.  Its extension in a new 2018 (‘Transitional’) version attracted 
considerable initial support from stakeholders.  
We argue that the Accord’s core features provide a model capable of use in other 
countries and sectors.  The GUFs’ claim to represent labour internationally, their expertise on 
labour subjects and their links with the ITUC, ILO and other organisations contribute 
dimensions that the local unions and the NGOs lack.  Without their involvement, the recent 
arbitration decisions discussed below would almost certainly not have been reached.  
Nonetheless, the NGOs also contribute potential consumer mobilisation capacity to the 
partnership, one which the GUFs do not possess.  These complementary institutional 
capacities are likely to constitute a necessary condition for reproducing the Accord’s success.  
The Accord’s operation has been widely publicised in organisations concerned with 
sustainable and inclusive development.  It was recently advocated as a model worthy of 
extension both by several Global Union Federations and the OECD’s widely-respected Trade 
Union Advisory Committee (TUAC, 2017). The willingness of international project donors to 
support extension, important in an era of declining union resources, has been noted in 
international trade union forums (ITUC, 2017).  The Accord has attracted very little criticism 
in comparison with alternative options for unions such as the OECD’s system for complaints 
against multi-nationals conduct (OECD Watch 2018).  It contains distinctive and significant 
elements that positively distinguish it from the Alliance, an alternative agreement involving 





contrasts with that represented by the Alliance (Donaghey and Reinecke, 2017).Established 
in 2013 alongside the Accord, the latter is close in nature to pre-RanaPlaza models of CSR 
programmes (terHaar&Keune, 2014).Importantly, the Alliance presents its terms as almost 
indistinguishable from those of the Accord, referring to them on their website as ‘legally 
binding’ (Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, 2018) despite material differences.  It is 
controlled entirely by the companies themselves, who determine what and how outcomes 
from monitoring are reported.There is no independent chairperson and no union 
involvement.  Further, while an independent Chief Safety Inspector is appointed under the 
Accord, global brands are free to select inspectors for their supplier factories.  The Alliance’s 
operation in practice has been criticised for reporting questionable outcomes on its website 
(Clean Clothes Campaign, 2017).  Overall, the Accord model and notably its legal 
enforceability offers global brands a greater prospect of mounting a robust defence of their 
activities in the developing world to consumers, ethical investors and other companies with 
which they are associated than the alternative.   
 
Nevertheless, although it represents a major advance on CSR approaches, caution is 
required in assessing the Accord’s positive governance characteristics.  Donaghey and 
Reinecke (2017) argue that the Alliance represents an essentially CSR perspective as 
compared to the Accord’s ‘industrial democracy’ approach.  The Accord is held to result in ‘a 
form of trans-national co-determination’.  The Accord’s deliberative aspects are undoubtedly 
valuable.  Nonetheless, the ‘industrial democracy’ characterisation sits uneasily with the 
minimal worker voice existing in Bangladesh, which has been only marginally improved by 
the Accord.  A recent report confirms that worker representation in the garment industry 
remains weak and patchy,  and lacks independence from employers largely because of 





Campaign, 2017).  Similarly, ‘transnational co-determination’ evokes the eponymous legally 
highly-structured German system.  That system offers much greater possibilities for legally-
supported workplace-level worker voice (and hence the possibility of effective co-
determination) across a much wider range of matters than obtains in the Accord’s case since 
the latter is primarily concerned with building safety.   
 
We locate our discussion within recent debates about how companies may best be 
induced to improve working conditions.  Until the Accord model emerged, private initiatives 
designed to regulate international supply chains in the garments sector had been largely 
limited to CSR approaches which lacked most or all of the Accord model’s elements.  
International agreements also had major problems.  Voluntary International Framework 
Agreements (IFAs) between GUFs and multi-national companies largely repeated ILO Core 
Labour Standards, basic floor provisions designed for country- rather than company-level use 
(Croucher and Cotton, 2011: 57-68).  Unsurprisingly,they often suffer from weak coupling 
between agreement provisions and workplace issues (Marginson, 2016).  However, a 
significant strand of literature has emphasised the utility of voluntary approaches. As we 
show below, some researchers working within this tradition have criticised calls for more 
enforcement-based and legally-backed perspectives.  We argue here that although alternative 
approaches remain relevant, the Accord model has been effective.  Above all, it shows the 
value of relatively strong legal support for arbitration creating deterrence via threats to 
brands’ reputations, backed by GUF support linked to potential consumer mobilisation via 
the NGOs as essential fundaments.  However, we also suggest that the long-term 
sustainability of the safety gains made is likely to depend on the strength of workplace 
worker representation as Walters and Nichols (2007) argued is necessary in all national 





The paper is organised as follows. Part I briefly outlines debates around how 
compliance with private regulatory initiatives can be achieved.  Part II provides the 
background to the Accord’s conclusion, the nature of its provisions and what is known about 
their effectiveness in securing improved safety standards in Bangladesh garment 
factories.Part III subjects the agreement’s provisions on legal liability and enforcement to 
detailed examination alongside a discussion of the outcomes of two recent arbitration 
decisions.  Part IV discusses issuesregarding the wider use of legally binding provisions of 
the well-specified type contained in the Accord and backed by GUFs linked to NGOs.  Part V 
concludes.  
 
 I: Engendering compliance with labour standards in global supply chains: 
contrasting perspectives 
In this section, we outline the arguments of two main schools of thought distinguished 
by different views of how corporations might be motivated to themselves adopt and in 
turn to enforce higher standards on supplier companies. 
Much discussion of regulatory policy trends within developed countries has 
been informed by a shift from ‘command and control’ strategies towards ‘regulated 
self-regulatory’ ones that are seen to form part of a new ‘regulatory orthodoxy’ 
(Almond and Colover, 2012). This shift is seen to encompass a movement away from 
regulatory regimes specifying detailed prescriptive requirements and emphasising 
enforcement by external regulatory agencies and towards ones that encourage the 
regulated to institute internal managerial systems aimed at generating compliance. The 
desirability of this policy trend, reflected in literatures around such notions as ‘co-’, 





Trubek 2007; Estlund, 2010; Sabel and Zeitlin 2012), continues to generate much 
debate. 
Underlying this debate are fundamentally different assumptions regarding what 
motivates corporate compliance. Critics of the new ‘regulatory orthodoxy’ hold 
essentially pessimistic views of these motivations, emphasising the search for 
profitability and competitive advantage while de-emphasising quests for corporate 
legitimacy (Tombs and Whyte, 2013a; 2013b).  They consequently view compliance as 
unlikely in the absence of sufficient external, deterrence-based imperatives and assume 
that in approaching decisions as to whether to comply with legal obligations 
corporations tend to be ‘amoral calculators’ who above all judge costs and benefits 
(Kagan and Scholz 1984). More specifically, compliance is viewed as being crucially 
determined by the extent to which duty holders believe that there is a real possibility 
that non-compliance will be both identified and penalised (Short and Toffel, 2010).  The 
arguments presented by this group do not exclude the possibility that companies may 
themselves derive some benefits from stronger and better-specified regulation, 
including a reduction in uncertainty and a stronger hand when dealing with supplier 
companies (Gooderham et.al., 2013).  
Proponents of current regulatory orthodoxy view motivations as far more mixed 
and as, at times, embodying a desire for legitimacy, or to ‘do the right thing’ socially 
(Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagan 2005). Consequently, strategies aimed at 
engendering compliance should, it is argued, reflectively recognise and engage with 
these varying motives and prioritise positively supporting and rewarding desired 
behaviours. From this perspective, more punitive and adversarial approaches run the 





organisations that will not respond to positive incentives (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; 
Bardach and Kagan 1982).  
The doubts expressed by critics of the efficacy of ‘compliance-based’ regulation 
and the virtues they associate with a more collaborative approach emphasising ‘mutual 
gains’ and ‘mutual self-interest’, clearly echo these differing perspectives on motivation 
(see e.g. Locke et al. 2009: 336). At the same time, however, their advocacy of 
mutuality-based collaboration is very much a qualified one. For example, in relation to 
how multinational purchasers can help suppliers improve labour conditions and rights 
through ‘capability building’, it is noted that such initiatives may fail to take into 
account the conflicting interests of key actors along global supply chains and ignore 
how institutional contexts influence the scope to improve working conditions (Locke et 
al. 2007; Locke and Romis 2010; Locke 2013). Locke also acknowledges that the 
creation of collaborative relationships may be complicated by such factors as 
uncertainty about the circumstances surrounding interactions, lack of information about 
each other, and clashing interests (Locke 2013: 179). Finally, it is stressed that an 
approach rooted in commitment ‘cannot replace state regulation’ or ‘substitute for the 
countervailing power that strong labour unions provide’ (Locke et al. 2009: 343). 
Indeed, a common theme in Locke and colleagues’ work is that private regulation 
cannot, on its own, improve labour conditions and that regulatory effectiveness requires 
the establishment of complementary systems of private and public regulation (Locke et. 
al 2007; Locke & Romis 2010; Locke 2013).1 Irrespective of these qualifications, 
Locke and colleagues remain firm supporters of commitment- rather than compliance-
based regulation to improve labour standards.  
Existing research thus allows considerable uncertainty regarding how far private 





support from the local state and/or effective internal or external monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that current 
debates focus attention on how to secure compliance from suppliers, rather than the 
brands they produce for. The work of Locke and his colleagues, for example, in 
questioning the effectiveness of compliance-orientated regulatory approaches, only 
does so in the context of buyer – supplier relationships. It does not therefore address the 
capacity of such approaches to engender compliance among multinational companies 
with the commitments they themselves have signed up to through either internal codes 
of practice or externally concluded IFAs. Yet there is ample evidence that these 
commitments, as with CSR- based ones more generally, are commonly problematic 
precisely because of their voluntary nature.  Banerjee (2017) shows how voluntary CSR 
and other multi-stakeholder initiatives have failed to take the needs and lack of power 
of vulnerable stakeholders such as workers in obtaining rights sufficiently into account, 
meaning that pressure for compliance from below is likely to be weak or non-existent.  
II: The Accord agreement 
Safety in the Bangladeshi garment industry has long been highly problematic.  
Accidents have claimed the lives of more than two thousand workers since 2005, and 
fires and building collapses have occurred regularly. Thus, although the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza factory in April 2013 that resulted in over one thousand workers dead and 
injuries to more than two and a half thousand was an extreme case it was a far from 
isolated one either in that country or in South East Asia more widely. 
The Rana Plaza disaster brought unprecedented international pressures by 
consumer groups, NGOs and GUFs for more effective health and safety governance in 





and Building Safety was signed by two GUFs (UNI and IndustriALL, a major GUF 
which had recently absorbed the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers 
Federation), and their Bangladeshi affiliates on the one hand, and more than 200 global 
brands on the other (Anner, Blair, and Blasi 2013).  The Accord constituted, at the time 
of its conclusion, a multi-party private initiative to improve safety standards in 
approximately 1,800 supplier factories employing some two million workers, or around 
half of the Bangladeshi garment workforce. Central to it was the establishment of a 
system of workplace inspections to identify and remedy weaknesses in factory health 
and safety standards. It has achieved considerable brand buy-in.  Only a small number 
of brands have failed to pay their membership fees (Accord 2018a). Brands undertake 
to (i) require their supplier factories to submit to rigorous fire safety inspections 
(Accord, 2013, Article (ii)) accept public disclosure of inspection reports of its supplier 
factories (Article 11(iii)) require their suppliers to implement repairs and renovations 
necessary to make their factories safe (Article 12 (iv)) pay suppliers prices sufficient to 
allow them to afford the necessary repairs and to operate in a safe manner (Article 22 
(v) cease doing business with any supplier failing to comply with any of these 
requirements (Article 13). In addition, signatory companies are obliged, albeit in a 
qualified way, to continue business at order volumes at least comparable to those that 
existed in the year preceding the agreement’s conclusion during the first two years of 
its operation, and also to ensure that health and safety committees involving worker 
representatives are established in all factories (Article 7).  In the medium term, the 
degree to which this last obligation is fulfilled in practice is, as we suggested above, 
likely to prove important to the sustainability of any gains made.  
More widely, the agreement provided for the establishment of a jointly 





follow-up the required safety inspections. It is also responsible for supporting other 
elements of the agreement, including the introduction of joint health and safety 
committees, the safety training of workers and the handling of worker grievances and 
complaints. Resources have been important to its success.  The Accord allocates US11 
million per year and has hired and trained 94 engineers, 35 remediation and complaints 
case handlers, 30 trainers and 15 training assistants to monitor fire, structural, and 
electrical safety in its factories (Anner, 2018: 10).The Accord has therefore been able to 
impose internationally recognised fire and building standards, establish a relatively 
well-resourced body to undertake inspections including follow-ups, and create a 
mechanism through which signatory companies can be held legally liable for failing to 
honour their obligations. In doing so, it can be seen at least partially to address some of 
the key problems that have been held to constrain the effectiveness of single-employer 
IFAs, such as a tendency to require compliance with (often poorly drafted and 
enforced) local laws, insufficient monitoring and enforcement arrangements, and weak 
local trade union/worker voice (Croucher and Cotton, 2011; Niforou, 2012; Marginson, 
2016).The Accord’s provisions relating to the transparency of inspection results and 
progress in remedying identified defects, those concerning ongoing trading 
relationships and the funding of safety improvements, together with its legally binding 
arbitration, mean that the agreement ventures into areas untouched by IFAs.   
The 2013 document outlines a complaints procedure for workers (Accord, 2013, 
Article 18).The commitment to publicise all inspection reports (Accord, 2013, Article 19/C) 
and to detail progress in implementing their recommendations is also significant.  It provides 
scope for unions and pressure groups to monitor whether safety improvements are carried out 
with sufficient urgency. The salience of transparency is supported by studies concerning the 





Gulbrandsen, 2010 and 2014; Schleifer, Fiorini and Stern, 2017). Auld and Gulbrandsen 
(2010, 2014) analysed the operations of the Forest Stewardship and the Marine Stewardship 
Councils finding that transparent processes (granting ultimate decision-making authority to 
members, open engagement with stakeholders, publishing assessment reports, and increasing 
the online disclosure of audit outcomes) improved both Councils legitimacy and 
accountability.  
 
The Accord’s Operation 
Given its provisions’ distinctive nature, it is perhaps no surprise that much optimism 
surrounded the conclusion of the agreement, with one commentator arguing that its full 
implementation would make a real difference and set a positive example for other countries 
and industries (Brown 2015). This expectation was largely fulfilled in safety terms (Anner, 
2018). A recent analysis (James, et al, 2018) also paints a generally positive if qualified 
picture of its operation so far; in common with Anner (2018) it shows very considerable 
improvements in building safety. However, James et al (2018) also pointed clearly to ongoing 
tensions between signatory brands and their suppliers. In many cases, progress on remedying 
identified safety defects has been slow and certainly outside prescribed deadlines, while 
almost 10 per cent of covered factories have been subjected to the Accord’s system of 
warnings and notices because of their lack of commitment to implementing safety 
improvements. In addition, although it remains unclear how far buyers are providing financial 
support to help make required improvements, tensions between the improvement of safety 
and the financial objectives of buyers appear to persist.  The continuation of existing pricing 
models has been a problem and there are differing perceptions between union and company 
signatories about how far brands are funding safety improvements.  These continuing 






Nonetheless, the same analysis showed that, with the exception of a small number of 
new supplier factories, inspections have been conducted in all relevant workplaces and an 
extensive programme of follow-up inspections has been undertaken. It further showed these 
inspections to have identified a vast number of electrical, fire and structural safety defects 
and indicated that many of these have been remedied. A common perception was found to 
exist among those interviewed that safety standards had improved significantly as a result of 
the Accord (James et al, 2018). It may therefore be argued that the Accord has to date 
generated unusually positive outcomes, a view apparently shared by global unions. In the 
build up to the July 2017 G20 summit in Hamburg, several GUFs called on participants to 
look to the Accord as a model for promoting sustainable business practices (UNI 2017). 
 
The two signatory global unions and some 100 brands have concluded a follow-on 
(‘transitional’) Accord agreement under which its safety programme would continue for a 
further three years until May 2021 (IndustriALL, 2018a).  The brands recently involved are 
supplied by some 1200 factories, as opposed to over 1600 factories in its previous iteration 
(IndustriALL 2018a, 2018b).This agreement in some respects goes further than its 2013 
predecessor. In common with the original Accord (Accord, 2013, Article 17A), it requires the 
establishment of safety committees and the provision of safety training in all covered 
factories (Accord, 2018, Article 12a). However, it goes further to state that workers’ rights 
to Freedom of Association must be protected to ensure their safety (Accord, 2018, Article 
13). It also provides an enhanced dispute resolution mechanism (now to include mediation to 
make the costly arbitration process unnecessary) (Accord, 2018, Article 3) and obliges 
suppliers to pay severance to workers if they have to close or relocate a factory for safety 





government to establish a national regulatory body that would eventually be capable of taking 
over the Accord’s functions (Accord, 2018, Article 15).2 In both of these senses it seeks 
sustainability through increased worker voice and government involvement. 
Thus, the Accord model is multi-stakeholder, has a clear and collectively agreed and 
publicised remit, places funding responsibilities on large purchasing companies, includes a 
local ‘civil service’, has ILO involvement, employs workplace inspections and incorporates a 
sizeable element of public transparency. It requires independent workers’ health and safety 
representatives on health and safety committees as recommended by leading experts (Walters 
and Nichols, 2007; Quinlan, 2014). It is therefore more inclusive of core stakeholders, better- 
resourced and more transparent than either the Alliance or other single-employer alternatives 
such as International Framework Agreements. The Accord organisation facilitates the type of 
discursive, persuasive and information-sharing exchanges advocated by those who reject 
enforcement-led approaches.  It also incorporates and integrates technical expertise from 
inspectors, which can also play an important role in persuading companies to put resources 
into improving workers’ health and safety (Croucher and Cotton, 2011: 111.). As of late 
April 2018, 152 companies had signed the new, ‘Transitional’ Accord (Wright, 2018). 
 
 
We now turn to the important matter of legal enforcement showing how it has 
recently worked in practice, and underline the GUFs’ role in bringing the cases.   
 
 






Legally-binding arbitration is a key feature of the Accord. In this section we report on 
two recent decisions which led to major improvements. The decisions simultaneously 
established an important principle which expanded GUF possibilities of invoking arbitration 
after disagreement on the Accord’s Steering Committee.  On the union side, only the GUFs 
have the internal human resources and external networks to pursue such matters, which local 
unions lack (Croucher and Cotton 2011: 50-2; 101-2).  This is therefore a matter of access to 
justice for the great majority of the world’s trade unions. Although we understand that the 
GUFs received pro bono legal representation in the cases reported on below, arbitration costs 
were met by them (private information).   
The Accord 2013 structured arbitration in the following ways.  Where a brand is 
considered not to have complied with its obligations, the agreement (Articles 4 and 5) 
provided that the issue should be submitted to the Accord Steering Committee, comprising 
equal representation from the trade union and company signatories, and a representative from 
and chosen by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a neutral chair, for initial 
adjudication by majority decision within 21 days. It will be evident that voting would be 
likely to lead to deadlock unless the chair cast a vote, unlikely in view of the conception of 
the chair as neutral. Nevertheless, in the view of the GUFs and the ILO chair (but not that of 
at least some companies), a decision of the committee could then be appealed against to a 
final and binding arbitration process. Any arbitration award, the agreement stated, was 
enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the signatory against whom it was made. It 
was subject to The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (The New York Convention), where applicable. The process for binding arbitration, 
including, but not limited to, the allocation of costs relating to any arbitration and the process 





UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (with amendments as 
adopted in 2006).  
The cases followed formal complaints brought by GUFs some two years ago against 
several major brands for failing in their legal obligations under the Accord (Allchin and 
Kazmin, 2015; Irish Times, 2015; Daily Observer, 2015).  Failing resolution of the 
complaints against one of these brands at the Steering Committee, the GUFs submitted a 
Notice of Arbitration to it under the UNCITRAL rules on 8 July 2016. Subsequently, on 11 
October 2016, a further notice was issued to another brand. In both cases it was alleged that 
the companies had failed to (a) require suppliers to remediate facilities within the mandatory 
deadlines imposed by the Accord; and (b) negotiate commercial terms to make it financially 
feasible for their suppliers to cover the costs of remediation. Declarations that the brands had 
violated their obligations under the Accord were therefore sought, along with orders requiring 
them to contribute to remediation costs. In the subsequent settlement, the brands agreed to 
pay these costs (IndustriALL, 2017). 
The two arbitration cases have shown the 2013 Accord’s value in holding brands to 
account.  Before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), both brands argued that the 
claims should be dismissed in their entirety on grounds of inadmissibility because there was 
no majority on the Steering Committee to send the case for arbitration (PCA, 2017, 
Procedural Order 2,s.IV/A/35 p.10).3On 4 September 2017, however, the PCA Tribunal 
constituted to hear both cases jointly decided that the preconditions to arbitration under 
article 5 of the Accord had in fact been met (PCA, 2017, Procedural Order 2, s.I/2, p.2). In 
doing so, it rejected the respondents’ (global brands’) argument that a deadlocked Steering 
Committee (with the ILO representative, as a neutral chair, declining to cast a vote) could not 
be said to have produced a ‘majority decision’ (PCA, 2017, Procedural Order 2, s.IV/C/59, 





Accord’s clause 5: a joint investigation had been carried out (PCA, 2017, Procedural Order 2, 
s.IV/C/52, p.14).  It further ruled that while the Accord Steering Committee allowed 
interested stakeholders a first chance to examine the subject-matter of alleged violations of 
safety standards in the Accord, it was not intended to be exhaustive in fact-finding terms, 
thereby allowing full fact-finding to take place during the arbitral process (PCA, 2017, 
Procedural Order 2, s.IV/C/51, p.14).  
The Tribunal also issued directions on confidentiality and transparency. It noted that 
while the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules required hearings to be held in private and 
provided that any awards could only be made public with the consent of the parties, they 
were otherwise silent on matters of transparency and confidentiality (PCA, 2017, Procedural 
Order 2,s.II/4, p.5). The Tribunal acknowledged the interests of the public, numerous Accord 
signatories and wide range of other stakeholders. Thus, the Tribunal recognised the Accord’s 
inclusive base and the broad spectrum of stakeholders which it represented.  It also, however, 
observed that the Accord itself acknowledged the need to protect the business information 
and reputational interests of the brand companies (PCA, 2017, Procedural Order 2, s.V/69, 
p.18).To strike a balance between these competing interests, the Tribunal consequently ruled 
that although the identity of the respondents and their representatives should be kept 
confidential, the cases’ outlines could be publicised on the Accord’s site (PCA, 2017, 
Procedural Order 2, s.V/101, p.25).4 
The PCA went on to rule that the arbitrations could proceed to the merits phase and 
that hearings would take place in March 2018.On 15 December 2017, however, IndustriALL 
Global Union and UNI Global Union announced that they had reached a settlement 
agreement with one of the respondent brands (IndustriALL, 2017). Although the exact 
content of the settlement agreement remains confidential, the GUFs claimed that it will 





are made available for that purpose. Subsequently, on 22 January 2018, it was announced that 
a settlement had also been reached with the second brand under which the company 
concerned agreed to pay $2 million towards remediation of more than 150 factories and to 
contribute a further US$300,000 to the joint Supply Chain Worker Support Fund that 
IndustriALL and UNI Global Union established to support the work of the global unions in 
improving the pay and conditions of workers in global supply chains (The Guardian, 2018). 
At the time of the case’s filing in October 2016, none of the brand’s known supplier factories 
had completed the required remediation, and all of them had at least one high risk safety 
hazard which had not been fixed. These included factories lacking fire alarm and sprinkler 
systems, lacking fire doors, and not separating flammable materials from the factories’ 
boilers. The unions’ claim for arbitration ‘spurred several of the brand’s contracted factories 
towards better progress—one went from a remediation rate of roughly 50 percent in October 
2016 to more than 90 percent in October 2017’.The combined number of factories covered by 
both settlements exceeds 200 (The Guardian, 2018). 
 
In this context, IndustriALL’s general secretary, Valter Sanches, suggested: 
‘This settlement shows that the Bangladesh Accord works. It is proof that legally-binding 
mechanisms can hold multinational companies to account. We are glad that the brand in 
question is now taking seriously its responsibility for the safety of its supplier factories in 
Bangladesh. Their financial commitment serves as an example for other brands to follow.’  
(The Guardian, 2018) 
The dispute resolution procedure under the 2018 Accord remains substantially the 
same as that in the Accord 2013, except that there is an opportunity for the parties to 





resolution of the dispute by the Steering Committee (Article 3).  This is highly likely to 
reduce the costs of resolving disagreements. Moreover, Clause 3 of Accord 2018 presents 
more specific arrangements than the 2013 version: 
 
 
"Any arbitration award shall be enforceable in a court of law of the domicile of the 
signatory against whom enforcement is sought and shall be subject to The Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York Convention), 
where applicable.” 
 
Clause 3 also specifies that: 
 
“The process for binding arbitration, including, but not limited to, the 
allocation of costs relating to any arbitration and the process for selection of the Arbitrator, 
shall be governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as in its last revision) unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties. The arbitration shall be seated in The Hague and 
administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration." 
 
 
Thus, any decision made by the arbitration tribunal is enforceable in a court of law in the 
global brand’s home country or any other country signatory to the New York Convention. 
Therefore, countries must ensure that awards are recognised and enforced within their 
jurisdictions in the same way as domestic awards. In the 2013 version, no governing law 





then there would be no national court in which the claimant could file a motion to compel 
arbitration. The 2018 version also specifies the following where the 2013 text was silent: 
"The arbitration shall be seated in The Hague and administered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration” (Article 3).  Thus, the 2018 version addresses the previous Accord’s silence on 
both arbitral institution (who should hear the case) and seat of arbitration, which in turn 
determines which national law governs the procedure (Dunmore, 2017). 
IV: Discussion 
We set out to use insights from recent literature on the operation of the Accord, together 
with two arbitration cases brought under the Accord agreement’s provisions, to shed 
new light on the deterrence-versus voluntarism models. We also sought to use the 
results of this analysis to assess the degree to which the Accord constitutes a model that 
could beneficially be transferred to other sectors and geographical contexts. 
 
On the first issue, that of deterrence, the conclusions flowing from the analysis are, at 
one level, straightforward. There is clear evidence that the Accord has served to 
improve factory safety through a deterrence-based regulatory regime comprising the 
agreement of legally binding safety related requirements, an extensive programme of 
inspections, including follow-ups and public transparency of the operation of this 
programme and its outcomes. Improvement was promoted by the opportunities for 
dialogue offered within the organisation’s governance.  As we argued above, the active 
involvement of the GUFs as the voice of international labour was important, and 
ensured consolidation of an emerging element of international joint regulation.   
 
Little evidence has been adduced of collaborative and mutually-reinforcing 





et al, 2018).  Rather, GUFs, acting in alliance with NGOs, were able to enforce worker 
priorities through a combination of the threat of consumer pressure, public concern and 
the resources and capacities they were able to devote to enforcing arbitration and 
achieving improvements on the ground.  The successful alliance between the GUFs and 
the NGOs therefore represents a significant case of labour-NGO cooperation.   
Our positive view of the Accord’s impact on building safety is reinforced when it is 
considered that many of the factories concerned had previously experienced audits done 
by, or on behalf of, global brands that failed to pick up the problems identified by 
Accord inspectors. In fact, Rana Plaza itself had been audited twice before the disaster 
– in 2011 and 2012 – by an audit company acting on behalf of a large North American 
brand which is now being sued by four survivors (Brown, 2017).  Taken together, these 
experiences suggest, as Brown (2017) has argued, that the Accord’s effectiveness is 
considerably higher than the CSR-based auditing arrangements that preceded it. 
 
Our analysis does not, of course, exclude the possibility that cooperative problem-
solving between purchasers and suppliers can contribute to better compliance with 
labour standards. Nor does it reject the idea that positive dynamics between brands, 
suppliers and The Accord can be established in the way some researchers cited above 
have argued may be done. It does, however, strongly suggest that the scope for such 
cooperation and especially its development in the longer term is likely to be very 
limited in the context of developing countries like Bangladesh. These countries are 
highly dependent on revenue from supplying multinational purchasers and trading 
relationships that are strongly buyer-led and cost-based (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi et al. 
2005). James et al (2018) and Anner et al (2018) both show that even under the most 





previously played a central role in resolving poor working conditions. On the contrary, 
it was the Accord’s deterrence-based regulation enforced by the GUFs which had 
driven global brands and supplier factories to improve health and safety standards. 
On the second issue, when considering the Accord as a transferable model, account 
must be taken of the impetus to its development provided by scale and severity of the 
Rana Plaza disaster and subsequent international scrutiny.  The garment industry is 
highly sensitive to such reaction because of the importance of consumer sentiment to 
their business model. Many companies in other sectors are less exposed to consumer 
sentiment.  The industry also has a higher degree of employer interest in the building 
safety subject than in many other related issues such as the Freedom of Association. 
The agreement that evolved was, moreover, only achieved after massive joint efforts on 
the parts of global unions and consumer NGOs, in the face of substantial resistance by 
global brands (Reinecke and Donaghey, 2015). Even then, some global brands refused 
to sign up to the agreement and chose instead to become members of the Alliance.  This 
background further demonstrates the challenges which attempts to replicate the Accord 
agreement are likely to face. So, too, does the hostile reception given by employers to 
proposals raised in the ILO to develop a ‘horizontal’ measure to regulate global supply 
chains (Thomas and Turnbull, 2017).  None of this invalidates the argument that the 
Accord represents a model that can usefully be adopted elsewhere. Voluntary extension 
of the Accord to other garment-related industries is envisaged.5 Other industries around 
the developing world such as footwear and furniture production also show similar 
patterns of low-technology, labour intensive production in which brands order from low 






National governments, as in the Bangladesh case, may have reservations (James et al, 
2018) and indeed these are threatening the Accord’s continuing operation in late 2018, 
but the case also shows that they may be overcome. Alamgir and Banerjee (2018) 
demonstrate how contestations surrounding the Bangladesh garment industry have 
created new private forms of governance and new regimes of compliance around global 
production chains in ways that create positive synergies for all those concerned. These 
forces played a role in reversing the Bangladeshi government’s initial refusal to sign up 
to the then proposed extension of the Accord (Textile Today, 2017). 
 
One virtue of the Accord has arguably been that it has operated at a sector level, 
reducing the potential for individual factories to cut corners on safety in response to 
pressures from individual brands and thereby taking such economies out of 
competition. The Accord’s provisions on the maintenance of orders to factories clearly 
represented an acknowledgement of this risk. By contrast, its current restriction to one 
country leaves clear scope for brands to escape its provisions by re-directing orders to 
another national location.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that brands are increasingly 
sourcing production from lower cost counties in East Africa and Asia where safety 
standards are likely to be less rigorously monitored and enforced.  This raises the 
question of how far brands may seek to escape regulation by using ‘spatial fixes’ 
(Silver, 2003: 41 ff).  It also raises issues about the sustainability of the safety 
improvements that the Accord has achieved. These issues link back to the ‘root cause’ 
identified by Anner et al. (2013). They also point to the potential benefits of concluding 
Accord-type agreements at a cross-national sectoral level in ways similar to the 2006 
Maritime Labour Convention (Bollé, 2006).Only the ILO and the GUFs have the 





police such agreements. 
 
V: Conclusion 
The 2013 Accord on Fire and Building Safety has had a substantial and positive impact 
on Bangladesh garment factories’ structures and fire arrangements. It has done so via a 
joint union-management approach which developed a regulatory regime encompassing 
well-specified legally binding commitments on global brands to be enforced via 
arbitration. Within this regime, the establishment of a relatively well-resourced 
inspection and follow-up programme entailing transparent reporting of the Accord’s 
operation has also been significant.  
 
GUF and NGO dialogue with brands, backed by legal sanction rather than the voluntary 
approaches advocated by some researchers has provided the essential foundation of 
success.  GUF-NGO partnership has been central to the model’s creation and practical 
application on the ground.  Yet far from driving brands away, the Accord has generated 
greater interest from brands than the alternative Alliance model. A revised and 
strengthened version of the Accord, along with its extension to other environments is 
now proposed. Given the importance of legal advice and assistance, and 
notwithstanding the proposed increased use of mediation, extended application of the 
Accord model will be assisted if the GUFs and their partners are able to access 
augmented resources. Indications exist that these may be forthcoming from the 
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1Locke goes so far as to argue that national governments in developing countries have far 
more ability to impose their will on global brands than is previously believed, and that they 
can ensure that common standards are applied to all producers within the same regional or 
national economy (Locke, 2013: 18-20).  In the Bangla Deshi case, the argument discounts 
the extensive overlap between politicians and clothing factory ownership (James et al, 2018).    
 
2Under an agreement concluded in October 2017 with the Bangladesh Ministers of 
Commerce and Labour, the BGMEA joint monitoring committee has been established, to 
review on a bi-annual basis progress towards meeting certain conditions for such a handover 
of functions.  These include demonstrated proficiency in inspection capacity, remediation of 
hazards, enforcement of the law against non-compliant factories, full transparency of 
governance and remediation progress, and investigation and fair resolution of workers’ safety 
complaints. In the event that the committee agrees that the conditions for handover have been 
met, the agreement further provides that there will be a transition period of six months, after 
which the national regulatory body would take responsibility for factories now covered by 
The Accord. 
 
3The PCA is an inter-governmental organisation located in The Hague, and was first 
established in 1899. It is not a court in the traditional sense but an arbitral tribunal which 
resolves disputes between member states (of which there are 121), international organisations 
or private parties arising out of international agreements. 
 
4The respondents are identified as Respondent in PCA Case No. 2016-36 in the 8 July 2016 
action, and as Respondent in PCA Case No. 2016-37 in the 11 October 2016 action. 
 
 
